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THE RUSSIAN MERCHANT MARINE
The rise of the Russian merchant marine is more intimately
bound up with national politics than is that of any other of the
merchant marines of the world. I t will be necessary, therefore,
in discussing its development, to call attention to the political
conditions which furnished the impetus to the development of
the merchant fleets of Russia. The subject, in other words, is not
purely a business one, but is in part political.
Of all the great powers Russia is least favourably situated for
foreign commerce. So severely has this handicap been felt that
the history of Russia since the time of Peter the Great has been
the history of a struggle to overcome this handicap, due to
geographical situation, by extending her territory in every direction toward the open seas. To this national impulse no one can
take exception, the fault is with some of the methods that have
been employed. That much has been accomplished cannot be
denied; for three centuries ago she did not have an outlet upon
the Black or upon the Baltic Sea. N ow she is the dominant
power upon both and has extended her territory well towards the
Persian Gulf and still holds Vladivostok on the Pacific.
Yet after all this extension of her borders, which has been due
in part to "land-hunger" but in greater part to "sea-hunger,"
there is still much to be overcome in order to put her upon something like an even footing with her competitors for international
commerce. The exit of her ships from the Black Sea is at the
mercy of other powers; the same statement is true of the Baltic;
and her best port on the Pacific is frozen up during one-half of
the year. For a time she held Dalny, which is an ice-free port;
but it is extremely doubtful if she will ever again hold it. These
disadvantages of Russia as a commercial and naval power are
well-known, as are also her military attempts to remove them;
but by no means so well-known are her efforts to build up a
merchant marine, in spite of disadvantages. Hence it is the
latter efforts to which we wish especially to call attention,
for although they are not so dramatic, they are none the less
interesting.
Up to the last century the Russian government does not seem
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to have awakened to a realisation of the importance which a
merchant marine would be to her in the career of expansion upon
which she had embarked. During this latter period her active
aid has been extended to three companies, which by the nature
and sphere of their operations and the amount of their tonnage
claim especial attention. They are: the Steam Navigation Company, the Volunteer Fleet, and the East Chinese Maritime Service. The history and status of these companies contain many
points worthy of notice. The formation of each of them corresponds to a stage in the maritime development of Russia.
The Steam Navigation Company is the oldest and by far the
most important of the navigation companies of the empire. It
was founded in 1857 by the initiative of Admiral Arcas and
N ovoselsky. A part of the capital for this enterprise was furnished by the government, and in consideration of its maintaining regular services it was granted an annual subsidy of 1,900,000
roubles. The company began operations May 2, 1857, with five
ships and established a regular service between the Black Sea
ports and those of the Levant and Egypt. During the year it
increased the number of its ships to thirteen, which in 1858 was
still further increased to thirty-five and which in 1859 reached a
total of forty-one.
The formation of this company by the government has not
improperly been called a political afterthought. The significance
of it becomes clear when we recall that as a result of the defeat of
Russia in the Crimean War she was forbidden by the treaty of
Paris, in 1856, to use the Black Sea as a naval base, and the fleet
which she could maintain in it.was limited to a few small ships.
Under these conditions, if her flag were to be carried to the ports
of the Near East, it must be carried by her merchant fleet. So the
dictates of prestige reinforced the demands of commerce.
Two of the finest ships of this company were present at the
opening of the Suez Canal to the commerce of the world; and in
the following year it availed itself of this new highway of commerce by establishing a service between the ports of Russia and
those of India and China. Unfortunately for the commercial
success of this enterprise, the industrial development of Russia
had not reached such a stage as to make necessary a very great
volume of trade between it and the Far East. Russia was not
then, and, in fact, is not yet, a manufacturing country and there
was then no demand for her raw materials.
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During the war of 1877 the ships of the Navigation Company
were given an opportunity to prove their usefulness in another
line than that of carrying merchandise. Four of them were converted into auxiliary cruisers and did effective service principally
as commerce-'destroyers. After the war several of the company's
vessels were used as transports in conveying 138,000 men and
22,000 horses from Turkish to Russian ports.
By a contract entered into between this company and the
government, January I, 1891, it was to receive II6,000 roubles
a year for fifteen years, that is, until December 31, 1905. In
consideration of this subsidy the company agreed to maintain a .
regular service and to increase its fleet by ten new vessels of a
collective tonnage of 30,000 tons. The greater part of the ships
of this line ply between the ports of the Black Sea, the Sea of
Azov, the Grecian archipelago, and the Levant. In the development of the commerce of this section. the company has been an
important factor. To such an extent has it been successful that
between Russian and Turkish ports alone it carried in 1900 a
total of 557,631 tons, amounting in value to 2,500,000 roubles.
But it has not confined its operations to the Eastern Mediterranean. I t has a line between St. Petersburg and other Northern
European ports, and another between Vladivostok and other
ports of the Far East. Both of these lines are operating without
the aid of a subsidy. It also maintains a line with tri-monthly
service between Odessa and the ports on the Persian Gulf. This
line is subsidised and may fairly be said to be supported mainly
for political reasons, as its traffic is very small in bulk and value.
It is aided not only by a direct subsidy, but exports over it
receive a reduction of 25 per cent. in freights over the Russian
railways. The government and company have issued a special
circular to the leading merchants and manufacturers of the
empire appealing to them for their co-operation in this enterprise
which, in the language of the circular, is "not only to introduce
the Russian flag in those parts now frequented almost exclusively
by the English flag, but also to open new outlets for the products
of Russian industries and bring into a close relationship the
Russian producer and the Persian consumer." The company
has decided to establish in the main ports of the Persian Gulf
"Russian Commercial Museums, " in which will be exhibited the
leading products of Russian industry. To each of these museums
will be attached agents with special instructions. It is not sur-
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prising that this activity upon the part of Russia in the region
of the Persian Gulf should have awakened the attention and to
some extent the suspicions of England, where it was commented
upon in nearly all of the journals, which found in it an indication
of the political designs of Russia upon Persia and a new evidence
of the constant co-operation of the merchant marine in political
work.
In addition to the deep-seated jealousy of England, there was
a special reason why the Russian government should have promoted this enterprise at the time it did, in 1901. This special
reason was a necessity for counteracting the effect of the BagdadBassorah Railway, a concession for which had just been secured
by the German Bank. It seemed clear to the Russian government that if it were to secure a share of the commerce of southern
Persia it would have to enter the field ahead of the railway. If
Russia were shut out from the commerce of the Persian Gulf,
she would have no excuse for pushing a railroad southward
through Persia to some point on the gulf, and there can be no
doubt that this is one of her political dreams.
Turning from the Steam Navigation Company to the Volunteer Fleet, we come to a,division of the merchant marine which
stands in a still closer relation to the government. This had its
origin in circumstances purely political. The action of the
Congress of Berlin in 1878 snatched from Russia the fruits of her
victory over Turkey. The Russian nation felt that this was due
largely to her lack of sea power. Having learned during the war
the usefulness of merchant vessels in naval operations, a part of
the patriotic outburst of sentiment took the direction of rendering aid in the establishment of a volunteer fleet.
The centre of this movement was Moscow, where the" Imperial Society for the Encouragement of the Russian Merchant
Marine" was formed. The name Volunteer Fleet was chosen by
the committee of this society. From Moscow the sentiment
spread throughout Russia. The demand for thus strengthening
Russian power upon the sea was everywhere accepted as a correct
expression of the national thought. On March 9, 1878, the
society asked t4e government for authority to open, in every
locality in the empire, subscriptions for the purchase of ships.
The Emperor Alexander II gave them authority. No time was
lost, for on the 22nd of the same month the members of the
society met in extraordinary session and decided to institute at
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Moscow a central committee to receive gifts and to offer to the
grand duke, who soon after became Alexander III, the honorary presidency, which he accepted. To Prince Dolgoroukoff,
governor-general of Moscow, was given the active presidency of
the committee. Pobiedonostseff, the Procurer General of the Holy
Synod, was made vice-president. They further decided to solicit
aid from the orthodox clergy, ministers of all other religions, the
nobility, the zemstvos, etc., and to ask all the governors to
appoint local committees to act in conjunction with the central
committee at Moscow in distributing literature explaining the
purpose and r6le of the fleet and to collect funds.
It was decided by the committee that the ships to be acquired
should be such as would be useful in time of peace to serve the
needs of commerce and in time of war should be put at the disposal of the government in the capacity of auxiliary cruisers,
and that the receipts realised in time of peace should be set aside
for the acquisition of new ships.
By the end of the month of June, a million roubles in gifts
had been received by the Czarevitch, Grand Duke Alexander,
and two million by the committee at Moscow. Ships to the
number of sixty-seven were offered for sale to them. But as the
committee had not the time to examine these ships one by one it
laid down certain requirements which had to be fulfilled. These
were a minimum speed of thirteen knots, bunker capacity
sufficient for twenty days, sufficient solidity to receive cannon
of medium calibre, a maximum price of 650,000 roubles.
The greater part of the ships offered for sale did not conform
to these requirements. Hence some of the commanders of the
future auxiliary cruisers were sent to foreign countries for
the purpose of having each buy his ship, its armament and the
necessary ammunition, and bring it to the place designated for
it. The first three ships were bought from the Hamburg-American Company, and their armament from Krupp. These ships
were of 5000 tons each and of from thirteen to fourteen knots
speed. They were delivered at Cronstadt by the loth of June,
examined and accepted by the Czarevitch, had exchanged their
German for Russian names, and run up the Russian flag. So
within but a few days over two months from the institution of
the committee and but six weeks after the official opening of the
subscription there was formed the nucleus of the Volunteer Fleet,
some of whose ships, particularly the St. Petersburg and the
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Smolensk, caused so much excitement by their unwarranted
interference with neutral shipping during the recent war.
As the Navigation Company, so the Volunteer Fleet followed
the line which the political aspirations of the country marked out.
It resolved to fly the Russian flag upon the Pacific, for by this
time the political centre of gravitYehad shifted from the Near to
the Far East. The Minister of the Interior contracted with it for
the transport of exiles to the island of Sakhalin; and the Minister
of Marine awarded to it the carrying of the equipment for the
port of Vladivostok. In 1880 it opened a passenger service between Odessa and Vladivostok and secured a contract from the
Minister of the Interior for the transport of colonists to Ussuri
and the Siberian provinces along the Pacific, which Russia was
at that time deeply interested in colonising. It also secured a
share in the carrying of tea from China, and Russian wheat to the
ports of Southern Europe.
But the traffic which it secured was not sufficient to enable it
to pay expenses. And to make matters worse it lost one of its
vessels by shipwreck. But in this crisis (1883) a subsidy was
granted it, proportioned to each thousand miles run by its ships,
and an extraordinary subvention for the purchase of a new ship
to replace the one lost. In 1886 the Imperial Council promulgated regulations as to the nature of its service and the amount
of the subvention which it should receive; its control passed to
the Minister of Marine. The old society was dissolved and a
new committee formed. At the time, it possessed seven ships
representing a capital of 4,200,000 roubles.
For a time after its reorganisation it extended its service in
several directions to Brazil, to France, Belgium, and Scandinavia.
But in these directions it was unsuccessful and soon returned to
its old lines with the Far East, where was the principal field of its
activity at the breaking out of the recent war. Its freight increased, but its passenger traffic had greatly fallen off on account
of the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway.
The Volunteer Fleet has had great difficulties to contend with.
The speed required of the ships in order to make them useful as
commerce destroyers in case of war is greater than is profitable
for freight traffic or for passenger traffic, unless with a large percentage cabin passengers, whereas, in fact, the large percentage
of its passengers was steerage passengers. Its ships could not,
therefore, compete successfully with others economically better
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fitted for the character of the work to be done. By the aid of
government contracts and an annual subsidy of 600,000 roubles
it has been able to increase the number of its ships to fifteen,
valued at I ,500,000 roubles.
It has been utilised for naval purposes twice; in transporting
troops and munitions of war from Vladivostok to Taku during
the operations for the relief of the embassies at Pekin, and during
the recent war. No actual fighting has ever been done by its
auxiliary cruisers; and, in fact, they are not capable of doing much
fighting, but will have to be utilised as commerce-destroyers,
transports, and scouts. It is fair to say that the Volunteer Fleet
has not realised the expectations of its founders, yet as an expression of the patriotic sentiment of the nation it is an interesting
object of study. Other nations can well afford to avail themselves of what is to be learned from its successes and failures.
As far as can be seen, Russia still holds to the opinion of Alexander
III, expressed in a report concerning it: "It is a very useful
national work, and it would be a' mistake to abandon it to the
arbitrament of chance. "
In accordance with the spirit of this report there has recently
been approved by the Imperial Council and Duma an appropriation of money for the maintenance of periodical steamship communications between Vladivostok and the ports of China, Korea,
Japan, and between Vladivostok and Nikolayefsk on the Amur.
The provisions of the law carrying the appropriations are:
"1. The Minister of Commerce and Industry shall conclude a contract
with the Volunteer Fleet for the maintenance by the latter, during eleven
years beginning June IS, 1908, of periodical steamship communications on
the following lines: (I) Vladivostock-Tsuruga, two voyages per week, the
aggregate distance being 101,820 miles; and (2) Vladivostok-Shanghai, stopping at Fuzan and Nagasaki, one voyage per week, aggregate distance 118,560
miles. The conditions shall be as follows:
"I. The Volunteer Fleet obligates itself to maintain the said steamship
communications, during the period mentioned, by means of steamships sailing under the Russian flag.. Moreover, the steamers must maintain a speed
of not less than fourteen miles an hour, after having shown a speed of not
less than sixteen miles an hour on trial.
II 2.
During the first sixteen months from the day of pUblication of the
present law, the Volunteer Fleet may maintain the said communications by
means of vessels sailing under a foreign flag and having a speed below that
mentioned in the foregoing paragraph.
"II. The Minister of Commerce and Industry shall conclude a contract
with the Volunteer Fleet for the maintenance by the latter, during one year
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beginning in June IS, 1908, of periodical steamship communications between
Vladivostok and Nikolayefsk on the Amoor, stopping at Sudsukhe, at St.
Olga Bay, at Korsakofsk, at Imperial Harbour, at Alexandrofsk, and at De
Castri Bay, making fourteen trips during the navigation season, the aggregate distance being 33,292 miles.
•
.
"III. He shall appropriate from the funds of the imperial treasury, for
payment as subsidy to the Volunteer Fleet for the maintenance of the steamship communications mentioned in Section I, 6,905,000 rubles, as follows: In
1908, 283,333 rubles; 1909, 800,000 rubles; 1910, 693,000 rubles; 1911.
672,000 rubles; 1912, 651,000 rubles; 1913, 630,000 rubles; 1914, 609,000
rubles; 1915, 588,000 rubles; 1916, 567,000 rubles; 1917, 546,000 rubles;
1918, 525,000 rubles; and 1919, 340,667 rubles.
"IV. He shall appropriate from the funds of the imperial treasury, for
the payment as subsidy to the Volunteer Fleet for the maintenance of the
steamship communications mentioned in Section II during one year from
June IS, 1908, to June IS, 1909, 75,000 rubles, as follows: In 1908, 25,000
rubles, and in 1909, 50,000 rubles."

The acquisition of Port Arthur and Dalny led to the conviction that there was need of a merchant fleet for operation exclusively upon the waters of the Pacific. To meet this need the
East Chinese Maritime Service was organised. This line was to
serve as an auxiliary to the Trans-Siberian Railway. Its headquarters were at Dalny, which the Russian government was at
that time sparing neither money nor pains to make a first-class
port and one of the great entrep6ts of trade in the Far East.
Their plans for Dalny were largely conceived, actively pushed,
and nearing completion when after an expenditure of millions of
roubles, a part was destroyed by the Russians and what remained fell into the hands of the Japanese.
The company began by purchasing the franchises and equipment of a small line operated by Mr. Schevelef. Several steamers
were purchased by it from English and German companies. It
was allowed an annual subvention of I I I ,000 roubles. Two of
its fastest steamers made connections with the weekly express
trains to Dalny. These carried the mails and passengers to
Nagasaki and to Shanghai. By January I, 1902, the company
had a fleet of eighteen ocean-going steamers, having a cargo
capacity of 24,000 tons and accommodations for 8000 passengers.
Its service bound together the ports of Shanghai, Chefoo, Niuchwang, Dalny, Chemulpo, Nagasaki, Fusan, Gensan, and Vladivostok with the ports on the Sea of Okhotsk and the Gulf of
Peter the Great.
In addition to meeting the difficulties of operation upon a
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storm-swept and rocky coast, a considerable portion of which is
frozen during half of the year and frequented by icebergs during
the other half, the difficulties of securing seamen and mechanics
in that part of the world, the company was handicapped by having its commerce interfered with by the plague at Niuchwang in
1899 (the first year of its operation), the Boxer outbreak in 1900,
the cholera in 1902, and finally the destruction of its traffic and
many of its ships by the recent war.
Had the Russian navy been able to hold control of the sea,
or even to have made a reasonable amount of headway against
the Japanese navy, the ships of the East Chinese Maritime Service could have rendered it most valuable aid and thus have
become an important factor in the war. In that event the merchant fleet would have more than repaid the government for its
assistance given in the way of subsidies. But by the complete
crippling of the Russian squadrons at Port Arthur and Vladivostok the part of the merchant fleet which was not captured
became helpless.
Among the commendable traits of the Russian character is
the virtue of perseverance. Hence in spite of the foregoing misfortunes and discouragements in their attempts to foster the
growth of their merchant marine, we find the nation assenting
to the following provisions for the purpose of encouraging
shipbuilding:
" I. As an encouragement to building metallic mercantile vessels constructed within the Russian Empire intended for navigation in foreign seas and
the River Danube and its tributaries, there shall be given for every ship
built, if its construction was begun after the promulgation of this law, once,
at the time of registering the ship in a Russian port, a shipbuilding bounty.
"2. The shipbuilding bounty (par. I) is determined by the registry
of the gross tonnage of the ship and is reckoned thus:
"(a) For ships with mechanical motive power: Up to 100 tons burden,
100 rubles; from 100 to 1500 tons, 85 rubles; from 1500 tons up, 65 rubles.
" (b) For sailing vessels, including those provided with auxiliary mechanical
motive power: Up to 100 tons burden, 80 rubles; from 100 to 1500 tons, 65
rubles; from 1500 tons up, 50 rubles.
"This bounty is also granted to vessels not intended for navigation on
foreign seas or on the Danube and its tributaries on the payment of customs
duty collected from those vessels on their importation from abroad. (Customs
tariff ed. of 1906, par. 175.)
"3. In addition to the shipbuilding bounty (par. 2), a bounty is likewise
allowed for the installation in mercantile sea-going vessels of new general
and auxiliary machinery at the rate of 35 rubles per indicated horsepower.
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"4. The bounties for building, like those for repairing of machinery, are
granted only if material of Russian origin is used in the construction of the
hull of the vessel or its machinery.
" Materials of foreign origin are allowed only on condition that they shall
be named in a separate list furnished to the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry every year and published for general information.
"5. The stipulations mentioned above are also applied to vessels not
intended for registry at a Russian commercial port.
"The bounties for the kind of ship are also given for a complete overhauling of a ship and its transference to the control of a foreign owner.
" 6. A refitting of a ship both as to hull and machinery gives the right in
favour of a national shipyard to a bounty of - rubles per pood (36 pounds) on
the metal used in the refitting.
" In case of the replacing of old machinery by new the amount of bounty
is calculated on the basis of paragraph 3.
" 7. The control of the granting of bounties for building sea-going mercantile vessels is intrusted to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in its
Department of Mercantile Marine.
"8. The present law shall remain in vigour for a period of fifteen years
after going into effect. The order for its application will be given in a
separate instruction approved by the Minister of Commerce and Industry."

This is an evidence that the Russian government appreciates
the fact that if it is to become a naval power it must lend encouragement to the building as well as to the operating of ships.
Whether or not her attempt in this line will prove successful is,
to say the least, doubtful. Her handicap in this respect is as
great as in the other. Her lack of coal and steel at prices which
compare with those in English markets places her at what
appears to be a permanent disadvantage. But even greater than
this is her dearth of mechanics. And though labour is becoming
increasingly mobile, such are the political conditions in Russia
that the trained mechanics of other countries are not likely to
migrate thither. Whether or not the Russian labourer can develop into an efficient artisan in these lines it is too early to
decide definitely, but it is entirely within the facts to say that as
yet he has given no convincing evidence of his aptness.
Among the merchant navies of the world Russia's ranks
eighth. Five years ago it was ninth. During this period it has
surpassed those of Spain and Holland but has in tum been surpassed by that of Japan. In the table of the Bureau Veritas for
1903-4 the tonnage of the Russian merchant marine was: steam
593,742 and sail 1,138,829; and that of Japan: steam 556,036, sail
730,660; while in the table for 1908-9 the tonnage of the Japanese
was: steam, 1,076,170 and sail, 1,242,099; and that of Russia was:

THE RUSSIAN MERCHANT MARINE

219

steam, 781,000 and sail, 1,350,386; finally for 1911-12 the tonnage
of Japan was: steam, 1,202,458 and sail 171,206; and that of
Russia: steam, 824,100 and sail, 539,710. Though the aggregate
tonnage, steam and sail, of Russia's merchant marine was in the
latter year nearly as great as that of Japan, the fact that the
steam tonnage of the latter is larger by nearly 50 per cent. gives
to its merchant marine so much greater efficiency that the
difference between them is considerably greater than the small
difference in aggregate tonnage would seem to indicate. A
realisation of this fact has no doubt had its influence in determining Russia's policy of increasing her subsidies. Yet in 1909 Russia was paying less than two million dollars in subsidies while
Japan was paying over six million dollars. As a builder of ships,
Japan has undoubtedly outstripped Russia and it is not likely
that in this department the relative position of the two will be
changed. Whether or not by liberal bounties Russia can overcome Japan's lead as an owner and operator of ships is less
certain, though hardly probable.
While the Russian merchant marine is still handicapped in
many ways and is still far from taking first place among merchant
fleets, yet when we remember the difficulties under which its
promoters have laboured in attempting to build it up, its progress is remarkable. The persistency with which the nation has
striven to overcome the limitations due to geographical situation,
lack of mechanical skill, and lack of a seafaring temperament, is
as much to be admired as certain of the means which it has
resorted to for the attaining of political ends are to be deprecated.
The reward of the former seems to us a more interesting and
certainly a pleasanter topic for consideration than the failure of
the latter.
EDWIN MAXEY.

University of Nebraska.

